>Reason has so often been the refuge of the enemies of empiricism. That it shouldn't be this way is true, but careful you don't fall into a "No true Scotsman argument," here; since the complementary view is not an accurate look either at history or of much of academia now, in my experience. Too-quickly assuming complentarity (as de facto true or worse logically true) is precisely how many people fall into the trap of conflating the two very distinct things.
The thing is, what academia or those people you mention say about Reason and/or Empiricism doesn't matter that much.
It's what people (e.g. actual scientists doing research) do that matters. And what they do is clearly using them complementary.
Just because there are theories that posit that it's either all A or all B, and people ascribe to them, it doesn't mean that it's indeed all A or all B. Or that a pure A/pure B even exists.
Please read up on the last century of history of science - in particular the Copenhagen Interpretation and for more recent history, Lee Smolin's "The Trouble with Physics." The history of science is replete with examples of reason being mistaken for empirical fact, and this seems to be becoming more common, not less.
The thing is, what academia or those people you mention say about Reason and/or Empiricism doesn't matter that much.
It's what people (e.g. actual scientists doing research) do that matters. And what they do is clearly using them complementary.
Just because there are theories that posit that it's either all A or all B, and people ascribe to them, it doesn't mean that it's indeed all A or all B. Or that a pure A/pure B even exists.