> For example, in The Myth of the Rational Voter[1], Caplan describes how it's actually rational behavior for voters to vote irrationally: the benefit of the degree they can sway the election is far smaller than the cost of acquiring sufficient knowledge to determine what candidate would most benefit them.
This is a minor detail, given that that was just an example you were giving; but in case it piqued anyone's interest, I'll correct it. That's not actually the explanation Caplan gives for voters acting irrationally (indeed, there's nothing that even appears irrational about that; that's obviously rational behavior). What Caplan argues is that voters rationally vote irrationally because they have preferences over beliefs, giving voting in accordance with false but preferred beliefs psychological benefits, and that if these psychological benefits outweigh the negative effects of the irrational voting, discounted by the low probability of deciding the election, it is rational to vote irrationally.
This is a minor detail, given that that was just an example you were giving; but in case it piqued anyone's interest, I'll correct it. That's not actually the explanation Caplan gives for voters acting irrationally (indeed, there's nothing that even appears irrational about that; that's obviously rational behavior). What Caplan argues is that voters rationally vote irrationally because they have preferences over beliefs, giving voting in accordance with false but preferred beliefs psychological benefits, and that if these psychological benefits outweigh the negative effects of the irrational voting, discounted by the low probability of deciding the election, it is rational to vote irrationally.