This is why the whole CA mechanism is fundamentally flawed. The only real way to move forward is going to be a web-of-trust model which is admittedly harder, and will result in messy situations, but does at least ensure people can control who they want to trust.
I'm not sure why I should trust the web of trust especially either. I don't think it's a bulletproof solution to the problem (if indeed there is one). For instance it could be very hard for a newcomer to the web to get trusted status, significantly delaying the time it takes to bring a new service online.
That doesn't need to be the case. You can have a weighted web of trust where if a new party (e.g. because they presented their passport & proof of ownership of a domain) gets trusted because they were certified by an already trusted party.
You could implement a weighted trust system where you're more trusted the more people trust you, and consequently if you "issue" trust it's counted as more trustworthy than issuing trust to yourself.
So you could have the equivalent of CA's in a system like that, but the list could be dynamic based on total trust on the network, instead of being issued by a static list of 100% trusted parties like the system we have now.
> You could implement a weighted trust system where you're more trusted the more people trust you, and consequently if you "issue" trust it's counted as more trustworthy than issuing trust to yourself.
Nice try, but now write up your defense against a Sybil attack. Someone could play a long con, gain a lot of trust, and then cause a lot of damage.
Ultimately I think we need something like the blockchain publicly associating a domain with a private key. Namecoins I guess.
This works for a while, but you'd still end up with problems (albeit problems that self-heal relatively quickly) when a highly weighted trust-issuer decides to misbehave.
Yeah, and a system like that could be worse in some ways. Likely what would happen is that what are currently the CA's would be the highest trusted parties in the system, and that trust would largely be derived from them trusting each other.
This is largely a matter of the game theory dynamics behind this, but if one of them does something bad are the other parties more or less likely to revoke trust? If they easily revoke trust they're creating a dynamic where if they mess up in "minor" ways their whole business could get destroyed. The penalty for not revoking trust soon enough might be much too small to create a system better than what we have now.
I don't know, and I wonder if there's been any research on the various aspects of replacing the CA system with a trust-based system.
You two seem to be discussing a very centralised model of web of trust.
The main point is that each user should have their own trust graph, not that there is any single trust network that we all use. Individuals are the entities that make decisions, and any emergent authority that violates the trust of those individuals gets booted by enough they cease to be an authority.
>> Individuals are the entities that make decisions,
The fundamental problem here is that most individuals don't want anything to do with managing trust. In fact it's not even that, it's that they don't know what trust means, they have no interest in learning and many of them are not even capable of doing so.
The problem that TLS and the authority system try to solve is "how do I set up a secure, trusted connection between two parties who have never met, one of whom has probably never even heard of a key pair". Individually managed trust graphs don't really help there. AFAICT.
>> any emergent authority that violates the trust of those individuals gets booted by enough they cease to be an authority.
Absolutely. But any system should be examined with game theory in mind, and I don't see that web-of-trust is necessarily immune, nor do I see that it pre-empts the kind of problem we see here - trusted parties acting badly for money/legal/government reasons.
I may be wrong, and would actually quite like to be.
